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THAT '70S SHOW: EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVOLUTION
Eric R. Claeys*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article proposes to update eminent domain law, at
least to the 1970s. While the 1970s are more popularly
remembered for disco and bell-bottoms, among hard-core
legal practitioners they are famous for changing the practice
of administrative law. For most of the twentieth century,
administrative enabling statutes tended to give
administrative agencies broad policy-making discretion and
to limit substantially judicial review of those agencies' policy
choices. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however,
lawyers and scholars soured on this extremely optimistic and
centralized model of government administration. They
worried that the moneyed interests regulated by government
often shaped the regulations that bound them-in many
cases, these interests even captured the regulators. During
the 1970s, in federal and state law, including the law of
zoning, courts developed hybrid doctrines of judicial review to
limit regulators' discretion to depart from the so-called
"public interest" to advance so-called "special interests."
This article has three simple theses: first, this
administrative-law revolution has not yet influenced the law
of eminent domain, blight, and property redevelopment;
second, it should; and, third, the debate over Kelo v. City of
New London' provides a convenient opportunity to do so. As
Thomas Merrill observed while testifying before the U.S.
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. Thanks to Brad Joondeph
and the editors of the Santa Clara Law Review for inviting me to present an
early version of this paper at their February 2006 eminent domain conference.
Thanks to Tim Iglesias and Todd Zywicki for helpful comments.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
867
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, from the perspective of
"an administrative law professor," eminent domain
proceedings seem "outmoded."2 Merrill's observation deserves
to be fleshed out more fully in a scholarly setting. Even now,
many state urban-renewal laws reflect substantial optimism
toward centralized planning. Such optimism prevailed
during the first half of the twentieth century, but fell out of
favor during the 1960s and 1970s. Contemporary
administrative law doctrine and scholarship still both give
administrative agencies broad substantive deference, but
they give agencies far less procedural deference than they did
before 1960. Administrative law's procedural and judicial
doctrines thus provide a middle road for reforming eminent-
domain practices.
This article therefore teaches two lessons. The first is
practical. This article may help policy specialists, grass-roots
activists, and legislators think more imaginatively when
reforming eminent-domain practice. Kelo clearly suggests
that important political constituencies are dissatisfied with
eminent domain, but it is not yet clear exactly what problems
animate the dissatisfaction, or what kinds of laws will solve
the dissatisfaction. Many, if not most, legislative proposals
drafted to respond to Kelo have been substantive; in other
words, they have focused on the merits of the conflict between
economic redevelopment and property rights. The proposals
discussed in this article are not substantive but procedural.
Because they are procedural, they may be not only
constructive but also less controversial and difficult to enact
than substantive reforms.
The second lesson is theoretical. This article helps
integrate the specific debate about post-Kelo eminent domain
into the broader literature on administrative law theory.
When eminent domain specialists try to strike a balance
between economic development and the dangers of
development pressure, they borrow administrative law
themes regarding the tension between vigorous government
action and public-choice pressures. This connection deserves
2. The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Professor Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia Univ.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1612&witid=4661.
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to be made more explicit.
This article proceeds in two parts. Part II briefly reviews
the range of substantive alternatives available in the eminent
domain debate.' Part III then explains why the procedural
administrative law reforms considered here provide a
legislative middle ground between the various substantive
alternatives .'
II. THE POLICY ISSUES IN PUBLIC-USE CONTROVERSIES
In Kelo, the Supreme Court held that a local government
does not violate the federal Public Use Clause5 when it
condemns private homes and assigns them to a private
developer in the course of a comprehensive plan to generate
more jobs, taxes, and general economic growth.' This decision
sparked broad popular outrage, which in turn provoked many
state legislatures to reconsider their eminent domain laws.
To date, the most prominent post-Kelo legislation
reconsiders Kelo on its substantive merits. Kelo raises
questions about the legitimacy of "private-to-private"
transfers, by which I mean condemnations in which the
government condemns privately owned land and then
reassigns it to a private developer so that the developer may
then generate broader public benefits.7 In this section, I
survey the main alternatives by which private-to-private
transfers can be evaluated on the merits. Along the way, I
illustrate each alternative through the use of prominent case
opinions and legislation.
To provide a brief survey of the basic substantive
alternatives, I rely on Thomas Merrill's 1986 article, The
Economics of Public Use.' Before proceeding, let me state
that I and others disagree with Merrill's evaluation of the
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
6. Kelo,125 S. Ct. at 2655.
7. See id. at 2678-79.
8. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61 (1986). For other restatements, readers may want to consider RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54-60 (6th ed. 2003), and Ilya S. Somin,
Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo,
SuP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=874865.
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merits of private-to-private transfers, and I prefer to discuss
property policy issues in philosophical terms rather than
Merrill's economics terms.9  I use economic terms here
because they are more accessible and familiar to most
readers. I use Merrill's terms in particular because they
identify what most observers agree are the policy
considerations central to eminent domain.I°
On one side of Merrill's taxonomy, private-to-private
transfers hold out the promise of reducing the costs of private
land assemblies. Private sellers may try to hold out to extract
a share of the surplus a developer tries to create from
assembling land.11 Eminent domain breaks up those sellers'
hold-out power. 2  Blight and redevelopment statutes
therefore help localities avoid the "type I" error of too few
efficient private land assemblies.
On the other hand, blight and redevelopment statutes
create three different sources of "type II" error, which is to
say, too many inefficient private land assemblies. The first
source is the "subjective valuation" problem that standard
fair-market-value compensation rules may fail "to
compensate the condemnee for ... the subject 'premium' he
might attach to his opportunity cost." 3 The second is the
"secondary rent-seeking" problem: if eminent domain is made
broadly available to facilitate private assemblies, it may
9. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property
Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004) (hereinafter Claeys, Public-Use
Limitations); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2002-2003) (hereinafter Claeys, Takings).
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword:
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 48 (1995); John A. Lovett , A Bend in
the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (2005); Trent Christensen, From
Direct "Public Use" to Indirect "Public Benefit": Kelo v. New London's Bridge
from Rational Basis to Heightened Scrutiny for Eminent Domain Takings, 2005
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1696 (2005); Benjamin D. Cramer, Eminent Domain for
Private Development-An Irrational Basis for the Erosion of Property Rights, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 411 (2004); Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation
Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the Commercial Value of "Hot News"
Information, 20 U. HAWAI'I L. REV. 421, 427 (1998); Lionel Marks Lavenue,
Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Contractors
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 394 (1995).
11. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 75-77.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 83.
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encourage "competing interest groups" to spend greater
resources trying "to acquire or defeat a legislative grant of the
power of eminent domain."14 The last is the "market bypass"
problem: lax public use standards may gradually undermine
private land markets, as developers and other purchasers
decide it is less costly to persuade a government to condemn
land for redevelopment than it is to buy the land on open
markets.1" In Merrill's description, lax standards encourage
buyers "either deliberately or negligently" to "bypass[] a thick
market exchange. " 6
It is not easy to balance these competing risks at the level
of generality necessary to write legislation. Let me restate
the more prominent substantive alternatives by explaining
how they value each of the factors.
At one extreme end of the spectrum is near-total
deference to legislatures. This view is informed by one or
both of two comprehensive claims. First, in private land
markets and in local government, there may be many more
type I errors than type II errors. In other words, in many
localities, land may be systematically underdeveloped
because developers cannot by themselves overcome the hold-
out problems created by negotiating with dozens of individual
land owners. Second, city officials and planners may balance
the type I and II errors much more expertly than courts. If
one or both of these claims are true, local officials and
planners should be afforded near-total deference.
Such deference is reflected in many eminent domain
statutes. In Missouri, for instance, government officials may
condemn land as blighted if they can establish "age,
obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or physical
deterioration" and also that "such conditions are conducive to
ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay
reasonable taxes."1 7  Many of these terms-say,
"obsolescence," "outmoded," and "inability to pay reasonable
taxes"-are so open-ended that city officials and planners
may reasonably claim wide latitude to choose where and
14. Id. at 86.
15. Id. at 88.
16. Id.
17. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 353.020(2) (West 2006); see also id. § 353.060
(empowering urban redevelopment corporations to deem land blighted and
condemn it after proper public hearing).
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when to condemn private land for private development.
When courts review condemnations under such statutes, their
review is similarly deferential.'" Condemnations are typically
treated as legislative acts. In most jurisdictions, a
government determination that condemnation promotes a
valid public benefit is reviewed only for whether it is
arbitrary, in bad faith, or the product of fraud or collusion. 9
Both the statutes and the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review were developed by lawyers with
deferential attitudes toward administrative law and
government regulation. As Wendell Pritchett has
documented, modern urban-renewal programs were
influenced substantially by early twentieth-century
government theory. 20 This theory tended to be optimistic that
urban planners could safely diagnose and cure "blight"
consistent with their expertise. Some of this optimism came
from early twentieth-century planning theory tinged with
analogies to biology and ecology;2' some came from a
confidence, bred in many social sciences in the first half of the
twentieth century, in centralized economic planning.22
At the other extreme, one might maintain that the type II
errors are far more serious than the type I errors. Justice
Clarence Thomas embraced this position in Kelo,23 and
Richard Epstein,24 Ilya Somin,25 and 126 have defended it on
its merits. Merrill's list of factors subtly, if unintentionally,
suggests that the various factors are of roughly the same
magnitude. I and others suspect, however, that the hold-out
18. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 556-57 (Conn. 2004),
affd, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
19. See, e.g., id.; see also Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66
Drive-In, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
20. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2003).
21. See id. at 14-17.
22. See id. at 18-19.
23. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679 (2005) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
24. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161-81 (1985).
25. See generally Somin, supra note 8; Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future
of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005 (2004).
26. See generally Claeys, Public-Use Limitations, supra note 9. I am
grateful to Todd Zywicki for encouraging me to develop the ideas in this and the
following paragraphs.
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and subjective-valuation problems are fairly minor, while the
market-bypass and rent-seeking problems are much more
substantial. In our view, the hold-out and subjective-
valuation problems operate at retail because they are project-
specific. The market-bypass and rent-seeking problems, by
contrast, operate at wholesale because they affect a locality's
economy and political processes.
This skeptical view makes sense if it is generally true
that local land markets and political processes are extremely
dynamic, and that information about owners' uses and
valuations is extremely diffuse and decentralized. These
assumptions influence how one values the various error
risks-but differently for different sources of error. To begin
with, local planners and officials seem less competent than
the affected parties to value the hold-out and subjective-
valuation problems. Obviously, owners are likely to know
their subjective value best, but they may underestimate a
developer's position and they may also overstate their
subjective value to hold out. Just as obviously, developers
may appreciate the assembled value of land best, but they
may understate owners' subjective values. Planners and city
officials, by contrast, are too burdened to forecast either hold-
out risks or subjective valuations with accuracy. They are not
as close to the relevant land. They have only limited time to
consider particular redevelopment proposals consistent with
their other responsibilities. When they do consider particular
proposals, much of the information they do get consists of
conflicting and self-serving interpretations of the limited data
provided by interested parties.
Most important, it can be difficult to quantify with
precision the inefficiencies created by hold-outs or
undercompensated subjective values. Like the "B," "P," and
"L" in the Hand formula,2" such policy values are easy to
imagine, but hard to quantify concretely with reliable
information in everyday life. Policy makers usually lack the
concrete empirical information they would need to quantify
such values. These algebraic factors improve decisions
primarily by calling attention to problems that planners
27. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(stating that "B" = the burden of adequate precautions, "P" = the probability of
an accident, and "L" = the loss).
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should consider and at least try to quantify. But they by no
means make planning as certain as algebra. Planning seems
less realistic if planners must evaluate land assemblies with
such uncertainty, in limited time, among parties with
conflicting agendas, and on limited facts that the parties
interpret to dramatically different conclusions.
Equally important, under these assumptions, the hold-
out and subjective-valuation problems are not on the same
order of magnitude as the market-bypass and rent-seeking
problems. Public laws not only regulate and settle present
disputes but also teach parties how to order their affairs for
future disputes. Because most blight and redevelopment
statutes leave local officials and planners with broad
discretion, they encourage those officials, planners, and
especially developers to test the limits of that discretion. In
addition, if redevelopment policy requires local officials and
planners to conduct as much guesswork as I am assuming
here, developers may influence redevelopment policy
considerably simply by presenting reasoned economic and
policy analyses that fill in the holes in regulators' knowledge.
Taken together, these factors encourage developers,
planners, and local officials to use condemnation procedures
more often and private land markets less often. If not over
the five-year horizon, over the thirty-year horizon, one would
expect to see land markets soften in communities where
eminent domain is used generously. In the process, it is
reasonable to expect that rent-seeking increases considerably.
Developers rationally prefer to give rent to local officials and
planners if the rent costs less than the economic surplus they
would need to share with home owners if they bargained with
the home owners in a market not affected by the threat of
condemnation. Of course, local majorities could frustrate
these sorts of trends by opposing particular assembly
projects. Kelo has galvanized just this opposition. However,
as long as the standards for private transfers are generous,
all sides will have credible legal and policy claims in favor of
their positions. Political processes will therefore spend
considerable time, money, and energy in conflict. These
conflicts rationally diminish the social surplus created by
land assemblies. Instead of sharing the surplus, the private
parties dissipate it by litigating, giving competing rents to the
government actors, and campaigning.
[Vol: 46874
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If these generalizations are good enough for government
work, the law should limit private-to-private transfers
substantially. Economic redevelopment laws should be either
abolished or limited to pure cases of bilateral monopoly not
the fault of either party to the bilateral stand-off.28 "Blight"
laws should also be rewritten to limit condemnations to occur
only when there is documented evidence that a property
creates a threat of crime or disease and that condemnation is
necessary to wipe out the blight.29 The interests that create
demand for redevelopment also pressure interpretations of
blight statutes so that the term "blight" is expanded
substantially.
Although these prescriptions are at the extreme end of
the substantive debate among academics, they are being
enacted into law in at least a few jurisdictions. The
Wisconsin legislature recently enacted a law protecting
homeowners from blight condemnations. Substantively, this
law does not change the standards for blight (deterioration,
age, or obsolescence). °  Procedurally, however, this bill
protects the owners of dwelling properties by requiring
governments to prove blight one home at a time, not by
making a broad ruling on a neighborhood.3 1 The Georgia
legislature has gone significantly further. Not only did it bar
economic-redevelopment takings,32 it rewrote the state's
enabling legislation to limit blight condemnations to cases in
which the government can prove that the property meets
objective standards like uninhabitability, imminent harm to
life, repeat illegal activity, and conduciveness to ill health,
disease, infant mortality, or crime.3 A separate provision
specifically denies governments authorization to blight
property on purely aesthetic grounds.3 4  This provision
repudiates case law, going back to the 1954 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Berman v. Parker, suggesting that the
"public welfare" can promote values "spiritual as well as
28. See Claeys, Public-Use Limitations, supra note 9, at 919-28.
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 178-80; Claeys, Public-Use Limitations,
supra note 9, at 914-19.
30. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.06(6) (West 2006).
31. Id.
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (West 2006).
33. Id.
34. See id.
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physical, aesthetic as well as monetary."35
Of course, these laws, and the doubts I have sketched
here, could all grossly overstate the risks of private-to-private
transfers. Both the laws and the doubts are informed in large
part from general assumptions that libertarians and
conservatives make about the relative strengths and
weaknesses of political and economic processes. These
general assumptions could be wrong, or there could be
compelling empirical data suggesting that the generalizations
should not apply to eminent domain. If so, then it would be
extreme and dogmatic to apply deductions from sweeping
economic and political generalizations to frustrate local
government. My point here is simply that neither extreme
can be ruled out given what we know about eminent domain.
Among other reasons, there are very few empirical studies
about how eminent domain works in practice.36
There are compromises between these two extremes.
Another alternative is to favor broad deference in general,
with "bite" in particular cases. According to this view, city
officials and planners deserve deference when they balance
the type I and II risks associated with redevelopment
projects. There is a risk that planners and local officials may
overestimate the type I problems and underestimate the type
II problems. At the same time, there may be no compelling
reason to believe that the risk is as systematic as Richard
Epstein, I, or others would maintain. If not, there is no
manageable doctrinal rule that legislatures can write or
judges can develop interstitially to quantify a risk that is
hard to pin down. The appropriate response is therefore for
courts to use ad hoc review to keep local officials and
planners from abusing the discretion they usually enjoy. By
applying deferential review with "bite" in suspicious cases,
courts strike the right balance between interfering with the
planning process and making planners and local officials
exercise their broad powers carefully.
Thomas Merrill takes this position, and he also suggests
35. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
36. For some of the studies that do exist, consider Nicole Stelle Garnett, The
Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 104 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.consol3/papers.dfm?abstract-id=875412, and Patricia
Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1976).
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that it informs contemporary public use cases are decided in
state courts. State public use law, Merrill argues, is best
understood as a combination of two legal principles.
Doctrinally, courts give government public-use
determinations near "rational basis" deference; but if the
facts of a particular case suggest that a condemnation creates
a serious risk of high subjective loss or secondary rent
seeking, courts use ad hoc considerations to declare the
condemnation to be an unconstitutional taking for private
use.3 Roughly five out of six public use challenges get
ordinary rational basis deference; the sixth is invalidated on
ad hoc grounds. 9
Another less deferential approach is to draw a firm line
between "blight" transfers and economic-redevelopment
transfers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor advocated this
approach in Kelo4' the Michigan Supreme Court made it
Michigan law in County of Wayne v. Hathcock" This
approach has captured the interest of many state legislatures
since Kelo. In August 2005, for instance, the Alabama
legislature made it illegal for local governments to "condemn
property for the purposes of private retail, office, commercial,
industrial, or residential development; or primarily for
enhancement of tax revenue; or for transfer to a person,
nongovernmental entity, public-private partnership,
corporation, or other business entity."43 In September 2005,
Texas barred local governments from using eminent domain
to "confer[] a private benefit on a particular private party
through the use of the property," or "for a public use that is
merely a pretext to confer a private benefit on a particular
private party; or ... for economic development purposes."'
37. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 115.
38. See id. at 108.
39. See id. at 96; Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause:
Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251
(2004).
41. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674-75 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
42. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
43. ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (2005).
44. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b) (Vernon 2005). One other feature
of the Texas law deserves mention. It puts the burden of proof on a local
government to defend a redevelopment transfer. Local governments bear the
burden to prove that transfers are not for the sole purpose of promoting general
economic development. Id. § 2206.001(e).
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In April 2006, Illinois passed a law effectively barring Kelo-
style takings by limiting condemnations for private
development only to blight condemnations. 5
This view tries to strike a compromise between the pure
pro-redevelopment and pro-property views by drawing a
hard-and-fast line between "blight" and "redevelopment"
takings. On this view, neither legislatures nor courts are
particularly competent to second-guess whether type I or II
errors prevail in particular cases. At the same time, there are
at least a few reasons for making a legislative policy
judgment distinguishing between the two types of
condemnations. By definition, "blighted" properties have
peculiar conditions. If homes are run-down, their owners are
substantially less likely to have credible subjective values.
Separately, "blight" could add a fifth factor to Merrill's four,
namely the negative externalities that crime- and disease-
ridden properties inflict on the rest of a community.4 6
III. THE PROCEDURAL ALTERNATIVE
A. Eminent Domain and the Administrative-Process Critique
Such are the alternatives a legislature might pursue if it
wants to reconsider its eminent domain laws strictly on their
merits. At the same time, however, there are important
political reasons why legislatures might not want to pursue a
solution strictly on the merits. As Part I conceded, private-to-
private transfers raise many substantive issues that are hard
to settle in specific and concrete ways. They also raise
difficult comparative institutional competence problems.
How well, after all, do private markets, courts, and local
planning each solve the same land assembly problems?
Politically, the debate unleashed by Kelo is still relatively
new for legislators, academics, and policy specialists. My
sense is that substantive laws cannot be changed until
legislators, affected interests, and elites all arrive at a broad
consensus concerning the right policy outcome. It is unlikely
that any such consensus will be forthcoming. No interest in
45. Equity in Eminent Domain Act, S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem. § 5 (InI.
2006) (effective Jan. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/94/SB/PDF/09400SB30861v.pdf.
46. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the debate has fully convincing arguments, and most have
plausible arguments from one of the four alternatives
sketched in Part I.
If so, then it is more fruitful for legislators to consider
procedural reforms. If legislators cannot draw bright lines to
define when a private-to-private transfer is impermissible,
perhaps they can agree on procedures that rationalize the
eminent domain process. To be sure, procedural reforms are
not totally substance-free. They usually reflect some
background assumptions about how to balance competing
error costs and policy goals. Even so, procedural reforms can
help. Sound procedure can give government officials
discretion to choose ends and focus on whether those officials
have chosen means that intelligently accomplish those chosen
ends.
One of the most important of such procedural reforms
occurred in state and federal administrative law during a
period running roughly from 1960 to 1980. Cass Sunstein
calls this period the era of "critique of administrative
process."47  This was a period of reaction against the
tendencies written into Progressive and New Deal agency-
enabling statutes that tended to confer broad policy-making
discretion to agency regulators. Starting in the early 1960s,
however, libertarian/conservative economists and progressive
legal academics and policy reformers all became skeptical
that agency regulators genuinely regulated in the public
interest. From different perspectives, these various critics
suspected that regulators were influenced substantially by
"public choice" factors, by pressures from the economic
interests they were supposed to be regulating in the public
interest.48 In response, courts developed procedural doctrines
that forced agencies to justify their decisions to the public in
greater detail. These procedural requirements were supposed
to force agencies to spell out the thinking behind their policy
decisions such that courts could determine whether their
decisions were motivated by concern for the public interest or
the economic concerns of special interests.
47. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 26 (5th ed. 2002).
48. See id. at 27-28; GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 257-65
(3d ed. 2004); see also ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 40-46 (1971).
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This transformation also somewhat influenced the law of
zoning. In the 1960s and 1970s, some jurisdictions developed
"spot zoning" doctrines to prevent local city councils and
planners from abusing the zoning amendment process for
public-choice reasons. One can see the themes of the 1960s
procedural critique in the 1973 spot zoning decision of Fasano
v. Board of County Commissioners.49 In Fasano, the Oregon
Supreme Court respected the general rule whereby local land-
use regulatory decisions are treated as legislative
determinations; it recognized that the "policy determinations
and guiding principles" expressed in ordinances and
comprehensive plans are presumptively entitled to deference
unless they are arbitrary and capricious.5 °
However, the court also warned that it "would be
ignoring reality to rigidly view all zoning decisions by local
governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full
presumption of validity."51 In particular, the court saw
differently cases in which a local council or planning
commission uses its amendment powers to draw a small zone
specially for the benefit of a noisy use in a quiet
neighborhood. Those cases raised the specter of the "almost
irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private
economic interests on local government."52 The Fasano court
therefore designated such local decisions as "quasi-judicial"
and created a set of procedures similar to those being
developed generally in state and federal administrative law.
To be sure, state courts and commentators did not follow
Fasano as enthusiastically as federal courts and
commentators embraced the administrative-process critique
in federal administrative law. 3 Still, Fasano confirms that
state judges have been receptive to the administrative-
process critique, and that the critique can apply to local land-
use regulation.
There has been no revolution in eminent domain
49. Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
50. Id. at 26-27.
51. Id. at 25-26.
52. Id. at 29-30.
53. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 544-48 (6th ed. 2005)
(documenting arguments for and against quasi-judicial review and the
jurisdictions that have embraced each).
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procedure similar to the procedural revolution effected in
zoning law by spot zoning doctrine. Again, state courts
occasionally invalidate condemnations that seem
inappropriately influenced by special interests on the basis of
constitutional public use guarantees. For example, a 2002
Illinois case, Southwest Illinois Development Authority v.
National City Environmental, used deferential public use
precedents to invalidate a quick-take from a recycling facility
to a racetrack on the ground that it was unlikely that "the
agency's true intentions were ... clothed in an independent,
legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public
use." 4 But constitutional public use law does not by itself
create a record, procedural rights, or decision-making
requirements. Those requirements are more properly the
province of administrative procedures and judicial case
development.
Administrative law procedural reforms may screen out
many of the projects that have stoked the backlash against
Kelo without forcing legislators to settle the substantive
policy choices raised in Part I. I am not aware of any states
that have yet passed laws implementing such a compromise
in a fully-developed fashion, but many state legislators have
proposed bills that illustrate how different compromises
might look. This Part surveys examples illustrating different
tools of non-deferential judicial review.
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements
To begin, consider the basic procedural and evidentiary
requirements that Fasano imposed on quasi-judicial actions.
To balance the gains from public action against the risk of
special-interest influence, Fasano imported into land use law
many staples of notice-and-comment review from
administrative law. Fasano required local governments to lay
a record with adequate findings for subsequent judicial
review. It imposed the burden of proof on the government
body seeking to initiate change.56 It required the government
body to document the means-ends "fit" between the spot
zoning and the government policy-that there exists a public
54. Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10-11 (Ill. 2002).
55. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
56. Id. at 28-30.
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need and that the need will be best served by the action
proposed.5 ' Fasano also guaranteed parties affected by a
proposed action a right to be heard, a right to present and
rebut evidence, and a right to an impartial tribunal.58
Requirements like those in Fasano can be codified. For
example, Congress codified many of the major developments
in notice-and-comment rulemaking in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, which substituted for the general
requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act its
own specialized notice-and-comment requirements. 59 At least
a few post-Kelo bills and laws have started to consider
revising the standards and procedures for judicial review.
For example, the recently-passed Georgia law places on the
condemning government the burden of proving that a
condemnation is in fact a condemnation for a public use.6"
Michigan legislators have taken a slightly different tack.
Some have proposed a constitutional amendment that sets a
preponderance of the evidence standard for establishing a
public use, and a clear and convincing standard for cases in
which property is transferred to a private developer after a
blight condemnation."'
Even so, state legislators have not sufficiently explored
the possibilities that procedural reforms have to offer. For
example, the Georgia and Michigan proposals say little about
parties' rights to introduce and rebut evidence, or the records
that local governments ought to compile to facilitate
meaningful judicial review. There is more room to develop
procedural rights to make local governments demonstrate
that their redevelopment plans are meant to promote their
communities' general economic interests and not the private
interests of developers.
C. Impact Statements and Particularized Findings
Another possibility is to include in state redevelopment
57. Id. at 27-28.
58. Id. at 29-30.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2000).
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (West 2006); see also supra text accompanying
notes 32-34 (discussing the Georgia statute).
61. Sen. J. Res. E, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mich. 2005), available at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(ul5myz452fonjteffexo5O45)/mileg.aspx?page=get
object&objectname=2005-SJR-E&queryid=15081060.
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enabling statutes a checklist of factors that local governments
must consider before deciding to transfer condemned land to
private parties. Such factors often appear in federal enabling
statutes. One of many examples is a provision of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which
requires FCC rules to consider statutory criteria relating to
cost-effectiveness, privacy, the cost to residential consumers,
and technological innovation.62 Factors like these give courts
specific criteria to use when determining whether an agency
has conducted a thorough policy analysis while making a
decision in its discretion.63 Such factors can also come in the
more restrictive form of a legally-required impact statement;
M. Timothy Iglesias proposes such an "Eminent Domain
Impact Statement" along these lines.64
Whenever governments use eminent domain to transfer
private property to private owners not regulated as common
carriers, state law could require them to make particularized
policy findings. Courts could then review those policy
findings on an abuse of discretion standard. Local
governments would receive deference as long as they
reasonably documented findings of fact and reasonably
identified and explained the assumptions behind significant
policy choices. While these findings could come in several
forms, three of Merrill's four factors provide a helpful
framework:65
" Benefits: How great are the expected economic
benefits from the assembly contemplated? If these
benefits are not certain to be realized, what is the
possible range of benefits, and what are the odds
that different benefits will realize along that
range?
* Compensation shortfalls: How many affected
owners stand to lose subjective values above
62. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(b).
63. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
64. See M. Timothy Iglesias, The Other Kelo Problem: Protecting the Public
from "Eminent Domain Abuse," 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2006)
(draft outline on file with Santa Clara Law Review).
65. I disregard here the rent-seeking argument. I assume it would be
extremely unbecoming for state legislators to require local officials to make
rent-seeking findings. In particular, imagine a local planning agency
determining to what extent a local project might encourage developers to pay
rent and local officials to extract it.
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market compensation? How many affected owners
value their properties significantly above market
value because they have made special investments
in those properties that have not yet been
realized? Do relocation assistance and other
government benefits lessen the impact of these
possible costs? If these subjective and investment
shortfalls are not certain to occur, what are the
possible ranges of shortfalls, and how likely are
different shortfalls along the range?
* Impact on land markets: Have the government and
interested developers tried to acquire the land
they need through private market mechanisms?
What alternatives were tried, and what
alternatives were deemed not worth trying? If the
condemnation in question is approved, to what
extent will it discourage developers generally from
buying land on private markets?
One could add other factors, such as findings about
whether a condemnation might affect different races or socio-
economic classes differently.66 Even so, the considerations
listed here provide a good starting point.
D. General Considerations
Let us consider a few questions common to these various
reforms. To begin with, how do these procedures relate to the
various substantive alternatives considered in Part I?
Sophisticated lawyers know that procedural rules usually
have substantive implications. If forced to choose, I would
guess that these reforms track the attitudes of deference with
"bite." Unlike the anti-redevelopment approach or Epstein's,
Somin's, and my view, these reforms do not limit the ends for
which local governments may order private-to-private
transfers. These reforms are noticeably less deferential than
current practice because they require local officials to
document their actions, their factual findings, and their
policy determinations to a far greater degree than arbitrary
and capricious standards do in most jurisdictions now. The
procedural reforms proposed here are probably slightly less
deferential than deference with "bite" as Merrill and others
66. See Iglesias, supra note 64, at 1-2.
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have described it. The "bite" in contemporary public use
cases is unpredictable. Judges may invoke it when a
particular private-to-private transfer seems improper, but
judges are not required by hard doctrinal rules to apply that
bite consistently from one public-use challenge to the next.
Evidentiary, cross-examination, and particularized-findings
requirements, by contrast, give courts requirements to impose
on local governments regularly.
If these procedural reforms correspond to deference with
"bite," they are subject to the criticisms lawyers and scholars
associate with such deference. Thus, scholars like myself who
prefer the narrowest view of private-to-private transfers will
not find such reforms satisfactory. At the same time, the best
should not become the enemy of the good. One important
constituency against the anti-Kelo drive ongoing in state
legislatures consists of elite lawyers and policy planners who
view vigorous local agency action as necessary and
constructive. Such elites should find acceptable the
procedural reforms presented herein. These reforms are
common fixtures of administrative law practice generally.
They are widely respected and agreed on by administrative-
law scholars. Many who do not want to tie agencies' hands
unnecessarily still are concerned that agencies are subject to
capture. For such scholars, these procedures strike the right
balance between judicial vigilance and overreach. The land-
use bar could also adapt to these requirements fairly easily.
Even though many jurisdictions do not follow the Fasano
approach in spot zoning, land-use lawyers are familiar with
this approach and respect it even when they disagree with it.
There are two other objections to consider. Some might
say that these procedural reforms are too onerous.
Evidentiary and procedural rights are sure to make private-
to-private transfers slower and more expensive for local
governments. Impact statements create choke points at
which opponents of government action can stall, demand
more evidence, and litigate, as has happened with federal and
state environmental impact statement requirements.67 The
67. See, e.g., NAT'L AcAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., MANAGING NEPA AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (1998), available at
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/process/napa-rep/napa-rep.html; see also Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
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United States Supreme Court and state courts have laid
down similar procedural and means-ends requirements on
"exactions," bargains in which local governments give zoning
development permits or variances to owners on condition that
the owners dedicate land to the governments. 68  Pro-
government land-use scholars have complained that these
requirements have slowed government land-use planning;69
the same charge could justly be made of the requirements
considered here.
Others, by contrast, might say that these procedural
reforms are not onerous enough-that they are futile. They
might worry that redevelopment agencies and developers
could easily backfill the administrative record if they were
determined enough to see private-to-private transfers
approved. After Kelo was decided, for instance, a local
newspaper learned by Freedom of Information Act requests
that, contrary to its public position, the Pfizer Corporation
had cooperated closely with New London city officials to plan
the redevelopment of the area targeted for condemnation.7"
Even so, these procedural reforms might be just right. I
am certain that the evidentiary and other requirements
discussed here would make it easier for opponents of a
proposed development to criticize development plans like the
New London plan litigated in Kelo. If the burden of
production is on a locality, the locality must produce evidence
for opponents to consider, criticize, and rebut. If there are
discrepancies in the locality's policy arguments, the
opponents may raise them; if the locality does not address
them, the means-ends analysis in these reforms provides
courts with automatic grounds for vacating proposed agency
actions. At the same time, I doubt these requirements are too
costly. There is always some trade-off between procedure and
substance, and it is usually difficult to quantify such trade-
offs in a concrete way. If a statute does not require findings,
it encourages condemnations generally, even when they are
68. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
69. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based
Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
231, 245-46 (2004).
70. See Todd Zywicki, Pfizer's Role in Kelo Takings, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 24, 2005), http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1130160017 (last
visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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not cost-justified. If a statute requires findings, the extra
procedure burdens all condemnations, both justified and
unjustified. Until land-use specialists develop a foolproof way
to determine whether private-to-private transfers generate
more type I or type II errors as suggested in Part I, legislators
and policy specialists will need to make an educated
legislative guess where to strike the balance.
While these procedural reforms are only part of my ideal
solution, I believe there are at least two good reasons for
thinking that these reforms strike a balance that ought to be
both socially constructive and politically stable. First, if the
opinions of administrative-law and land-use elites are
probative, these reforms strike the right balance between
preventing serious public-choice problems and tying local
government's hands. Second, while we still do not know how
the debate over Kelo will ultimately be resolved, we do know
that the general public is irate at something about Kelo. It is
reasonable to suspect that one important factor stoking the
backlash against Kelo is a general suspicion that local
governments are tied too closely too developers. In the
absence of more compelling reasons, these elite and public
opinions should serve as useful justifications for legislative
reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many state legislatures are considering proposals to
overhaul the substance of their eminent domain, blight, and
redevelopment laws. At least as a first step, these
legislatures might want to stop arguing over substance and
consider procedural reforms similar to the reforms now
typical in federal administrative law and state quasi-judicial
spot zoning law. The substantive issues are intractable, and
different constituencies in the eminent domain debate are
strongly attached to one or the other of the main substantive
alternatives. By contrast, eminent domain statutes on the
books do not provide many details about parties' procedural
rights, and they codify very deferential standards of judicial
review. These statutes seem out of date because elite and
public attitudes toward government regulation have grown
more suspicious of rent-seeking and capture problems than
when such statutes were drafted. Such suspicions surely
inform the current public hostility toward the Kelo decision.
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If those elite and public attitudes are valid, procedural
reforms should improve local practices for private-to-private
transfers in ways that are both socially constructive and
politically sustainable.
